

# Colorado Emergency Preparedness Assessment Annual Report: 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024

## Office of Emergency Management


Email: CEPA@state.co.us

Website: DHSEM.Colorado.gov/CEPA

Address: 9195 E. Mineral Avenue, Suite 200

Centennial, CO 80112





## **Table of Contents**

Director Letter	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Executive Summary	1
Introduction	4
The Data Sample	7
Highest Assessed Threats and Hazards	8
FEMA's 32 Core Capabilities by Mission Area	10
What are the POETE Elements	11
Capability Key Findings	12
Mission Area Core Capability Assessment	13
POETE Element Assessment	25
Capacity to Respond within Capabilities	32
Capabilities Reliance on Grants	33
Alignment with Integrated Preparedness Priorities	34
Capabilities Built and Lost	36
Access and Functional Needs Assessment	37
Conclusion	39
Annexes	
A: Core Capabilities	A-1
B: Threats and Hazards	B-1
C: Additional Assessments	C-1
D: Definitions of Assessment Marks	D-1

# Letter from the Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Director



#### Greetings!

It is my privilege to present the 2024 Colorado Emergency Preparedness Assessment (CEPA) Annual Report. Although this report covers only State Fiscal Year 2023-2024, it is the result of over five years of development and implementation of the CEPA Program. Since its creation in 2020, the CEPA Program has helped 56 Colorado counties assess their emergency preparedness across the mission areas of Protection, Prevention, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.

Now that we are in Cycle Two (2023-2026), both the state and local jurisdictions are able to conduct a comparative analysis with Cycle One (2020-2023) to determine if our preparedness efforts are paying off. I am pleased to report that the initial Cycle Two data shows that we are making significant progress in making Colorado a safer, more resilient place for residents and visitors.

However, there is still work to be done. As threats and hazards evolve, so must our preparedness efforts. Fortunately, through CEPA, we have a means by which we can accurately assess our preparedness efforts and, as a state, make adjustments.

Sincerely,

Kevin R. Klein

Director, Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

## Acknowledgements

The Colorado Emergency Preparedness Assessment (CEPA) team from the Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM) Plans Section extends our gratitude to all local communities and stakeholders who have participated in the CEPA program. We acknowledge the hard work and the significant amount of time that goes into the process and are very appreciative of the invaluable contributions each participant has made to improving their jurisdictions preparedness. We extend a special thanks to our state agency partners, executive leadership, and DHSEM partners. CEPA would not be the success it is today without your support. Lastly, we commend the diligent efforts and dedication our CEPA team invests in ensuring the process runs effectively and smoothly.

The twelve counties who participated in Cycle 2a, taking place from July 2023 to June 2024 include Adams, Archuleta, Baca, Custer, Fremont, Gilpin, Montrose, Morgan, Pueblo, Sedgwick, Teller, and Yuma. The CEPA team is greatly appreciative for the time the local jurisdictions put into the process and their willingness to share the data collected during these sessions. We look forward to their next CEPA cycle in 2027.

We would like to personally thank Morgan Haskett for her time, dedication, and hard work in developing the first annual CEPA report.

Best Regards, The CEPA Team

## **Executive Summary**

Twelve counties within the state of Colorado participated in the CEPA process during the 2024 fiscal year. The information collected during the CEPA process utilized county level (to include municipalities) data to establish an understanding of local preparedness throughout the state and indicates statewide trends.

Statewide trends show an increase in the number of declared disasters in Colorado. Counties need additional resources, equipment, personnel, and time allocated to emergency management work. Some counties do not have the resources to support a full-time emergency manager. There is a high demand for auxiliary emergency management staff (e.g., deputy emergency managers) to fulfill the needs and demands of local emergency management.

Many counties identified their strong reliance on regional partnerships, mutual aid agreements (MAAs), and memorandums of understanding (MOUs). The core capabilities supported most by these agreements included:

Forensics and Attribution

Environmental Response/ Health and Safety

Environmental Response/ Fatality Management

These core capabilities (i.e., Fatality Management and Environmental Response/Health and Safety) had the shortest response capacities with the ability to self maintain for just over twenty-four hours. Dependencies can indicate the resources a county may need or request in the event of an incident. Jurisdictions may require the following capability resources:



Challenges across most core capabilities included:

- staffing shortages
- volunteer recruitment
- retention of personnel
- personnel leaving to jurisdictions with more competitive wages.

## **Executive Summary (Continued)**

#### Mission Area Findings

Recovery core capabilities were assessed low:

#### Housing

- Lack of affordable housing across the state.
- Homeowners reported the loss of insurance due to companies cancelling coverage in wildfire prone areas.

## Natural and Cultural Resources

 Many struggle to identify relevant sites due to access and information sharing restrictions. Other low assessed Capabilities:

### Environmental Response/Health and Safety

 Limited available resources and qualified personnel trained to handle hazardous materials incidents.

# Logistics and Supply Chain Management

Need to identify supply chains.

On the contrary, high assessed capabilities included:

Threat and Hazard Identification Fire Management and Suppression Public
Health,
Healthcare,
and
Emergency
Medical
Services

On-Scene Security and Protection

Situational Assessment

#### **POETE** findings

The Planning element has the highest capability average. Counties have plans, policies, procedures and are in the process of formalizing or have updated recently. Needs in this element include:

- Plans must be reviewed
- · Coordinated with other agencies
- And updated

The organization element has medium capability. Jurisdictions have half of the structure and staffing required. To bolster this capability, there is a need to further understand agency roles and responsibilities

## **Executive Summary (Continued)**

Most counties stated they have at least half of the required equipment to support capabilities. Challenges in this element included:

- Shortages in funding.
- · High equipment maintenance costs.
- · Continuous equipment updates.
- Need to develop capital investment plans to support long-term expenditures.

The training element was assessed low, relatively. Most jurisdictions indicated they have less than 50% of required training. Challenges in this element included:

- Continuous need to train personnel (e.g., due to turnover).
- Equipment updates and upgrades.
- Limited flexibility to travel to attend or obtain training.
- Cost to backfill or inability to backfill personnel while employees are training.
- Limited core offerings in certain core capabilities.

Exercise had the lowest assessment average. Evolving plans, updates, new personnel, and new equipment all drive the need to exercise. Challenges included:

- Developing, performing, and evaluating exercises.
- Update plans, policies, and procedures from after action reports.
- · Improvement plans should reflect findings.

#### Threats and Hazards

Trends revealed jurisdictions assessed wildfire and cyber attack as the highest risk. Other highly assessed threats and hazards included:



The risk prioritization of these threats and hazards varied depending on the jurisdiction.

#### **Grant Reliance**

Capability grant reliance varies vastly depending on the county, although many identified significant reliance supporting the Threats and Hazards Identification capability. Most jurisdictions are seeking to identify their grant funding dependencies. Capabilities with strong reliance's on grants may be left vulnerable if funding is reduced or removed.

### **CEPA Introduction**

This report highlights trends and key findings as a result of the data collection and analysis: utilizing county level (to include municipalities) reports to develop an understanding of local preparedness throughout the state. Additionally, the annual report analyzes the local trends and identifies parallels to state trends. A deeper understanding of what gaps, needs, and challenges local jurisdictions may face will be developed.

#### The CEPA process does the following:

- Identifies local threats and hazards.
- Assesses a county's ability to deliver FEMA's thirty-two core capabilities by reviewing planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise (POETE) elements within each capability.
- · Identifies capability gaps and highlights opportunities for improvement.
- · Reviews local jurisdictions' response capacity.
- Creates an environment for communication and information sharing while promoting whole community engagement.
- May inform elected officials, agency leaders, and community stakeholders on local capability needs.
- Is a key input to local integrated prepared planning efforts.
- Provides documentation to support funding requests in grant applications and budgetary reviews.

This report identifies how CEPA fits into the state, supports the vision of the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM), reinforces the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) objectives, and aligns with county level objectives. An overview of how CEPA works, the participating counties, and session participants is provided. Jurisdictions assessed threats and hazards are identified.

The report provides a brief background on core capabilities, mission areas, and POETE elements. An in-depth gap and trend analysis of each POETE element is included. The report provides gaps and opportunities all thirty-two capabilities and identifies mission area trends. The report identifies trends in local jurisdictions capacity to respond within fifteen response capabilities and all thirty-two capabilities reliance on grants. The report reviews trends in capabilities included in local counties Integrated Preparedness Plans and identify capabilities that were built and lost since counties previous CEPA reports. There is a trend analysis for Access and Functional Needs (AFN) provided. The report concludes with a summary and next steps for CEPA.

#### **OUR VISION**

A prepared, safe and resilient Colorado!

#### CEPA's Role within the State

CEPA informs the organizational levels within the state including local, section, office, and division to support each levels' objectives. The assessments strengthen local preparedness as counties identify their needs,


assess their capabilities, and utilize the information to prepare for incidents. The knowledge of the gaps and needs better enables counties to better understand their capability and the potential to increase preparedness and public safety.

Each DHSEM section is supported by CEPA with relevant data for their missions. For example, CEPA gathers relevant data for the Integrated Preparedness Plan and process, informing the Integrated Preparedness Section. At the office level, CEPA supports OEM strategic objectives discussed on the following page. The assessments support DHSEM at a division level with pertinent information to support office missions, development, and relevant information for community outreach. For example, Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) uses the data for cybersecurity gap analysis; the Office of Grants Management (OGM) uses data to inform local level grant funding and implementation. CEPA supports the state by informing other assessments such as the Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) and the Stakeholder Preparation Review (SPR).

"CEPA feeds the Integrated Preparedness Plan (IPP) and the IPP feeds the projects that the Office of Grants Management implements at the local level with grant funding."

- Director Michael Haney, Office of Grants Management

The image below shows how CEPA has a place and a role within each level of organizations. By understanding how CEPA supports the organization, we are better equipped to use the CEPA data and find additional ways to utilize the information at different organizational levels.



#### **OUR MISSION**

To lead and support Colorado's effort to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to and recover from all-hazards events.

## The Assessments' Alignment in OEM and Counties

# Alignment with the Office of Emergency Management (OEM)

CEPA supports two OEM Strategic Objectives.

- •<u>Strategic Objective 2</u>: Increase local jurisdiction response and recovery preparedness.
  - CEPA supports local jurisdictions in their assessment (e.g., gaps and needs), identifying areas that need to be strengthened and to increase preparedness. The assessment reviews the fifteen response capabilities and the eight recovery capabilities. The information gathered can be used to increase local response and recovery preparedness.
- •<u>Strategic Objective 4</u>: Develop and maintain OEM subject matter expertise on emergency management operations and be prepared to provide that expertise to local/tribal governments from disaster onset through incident management, recovery operations, and return to community stabilization.
  - CEPA gathers information from discussions with counties about core capabilities (e.g., what is working and what is not). Discussions inform OEM, maintain subject matter expertise, and help to gain an awareness of local emergency management, preparing OEM to better support and assist local and tribal governments.


#### **County Alignment**

- Counties identify potential threats and hazards that may need to be addressed. The assessment can guide local preparedness program priorities, assist in spending decisions, can help identify projects in mitigation plans.
- CEPA assists counties by informing their Integrated Preparedness processes and plans. The data can identify gaps and needs to be used in determining future capability priorities. Additionally, CEPA highlights what capability and POETE elements were identified in current Integrated Preparedness Plans (IPP).
- Information collected during the CEPA may help to inform and drive local level objectives and priorities. The data may also inform local meetings such as Local Emergency Preparedness Committees (LEPC) and Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Groups.
- The process can be used to inform state partners and strengthen the state's position to support and provide resources in the event of an incident or emergency.

## The Data Sample

This report analyzes over 4,560 data points. The data analyzed during the period of July 1st, 2023, to June 30th, 2024, (Cycle 2a) is provided by eight of the service areas (i.e., Central, East, North, Northeast, South, Southeast, Southwest, and West); seven of the all-hazard regions (i.e., North Central, Northeast, South, South Central, Southeast, Southwest, and West).

Map of Colorado shaded with the twelve participating counties (Cycle 2a)



There were 393 participants from a variety of different department levels, including: city (42), county (238), federal (10), other (35), state (66), and tribal (2).

Participants were from more than 26 different disciplines:


- Agriculture (8)
- American Red Cross (7)
- Chief Information Officer/Public Information Officer (6)
- Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) (7)
- Community Advocacy Group (3)
- Community Economic Group (7)
- Coroner (6)
- Disability/Access and Functional Needs (1)
- Dispatch (19)
- Education (5)
- Executive Branch (26)
- Faith-Based Organization (1)
- Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) (68)

- Historic Cultural Resources (1)
- Hospital/Health Care (24)
- Human Services (8)
- Law Enforcement/Public Safety (48)
- Office of Emergency Management (72)
- Private Sector/Business (3)
- Public Health (15)
- Public Works (city/county) (13)
- Search and Rescue (3)
- Transportation (6)
- Utilities/Public Works (Private) (10)
- Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) (2)
- Other (24)

## **Highest Assessed Threats and Hazards**

The CEPA process includes a risk assessment for a series of natural hazards, human-caused, and technological threats using a likelihood and consequence methodology. The likelihood scale ranges from "not expected to occur" (1) to "expected to occur, without question" (5). The consequence ranges from having "virtually no impact" (1) to a "devastating impact" (5). These two variables are multiplied together (maximum of 25) to identify the relative risk of the threat.

Counties were provided thirty-four threats and hazards and able to add additional threats. A breakdown of the risk assessment is illustrated on the following page. Please refer to the Annex B to see all threats and hazards and Annex D for additional information on how threats and hazards were assessed.



The chart shows the top fifteen threats and hazards.

## Threats and Hazards Key Findings

The threats and hazards that pose the greatest consequences are wildfire, cyber attack, drought, pandemic/epidemic, hazardous materials release, active shooter/threat, explosive attack/bomb threat, terrorist attack, and chemical, biological, and nuclear attack.

Wildlife-vehicle collusions, infrastructure failure, power failure, severe wind, severe winter weather, thunderstorms and lightning, hail, pest infestation, extreme temperature, wildfire, cyber attack, and drought are most likely to occur. Their consequences range from low to high.

The highest relative risks are wildfire, cyber attack, and drought.

		Consequence				
		Low	Medium	High		
Likelihood	Low	<ul> <li>Earthquake</li> <li>Mine Accidents</li> <li>Subsidence &amp; Abandoned Mine Lands</li> <li>Expansive Soils and Heaving Bedrock Avalanche</li> </ul>	• -Radiological Release	Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Attack		
	Medium	<ul> <li>Radon (Rn), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Methane (CH4) Seeps</li> <li>Dense Fog</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Explosive Attack/Bomb Threat</li> <li>Water Contamination</li> <li>Dam and Levee Failure</li> <li>Flood</li> <li>Tornadoes</li> <li>Animal Disease</li> <li>Civil Disorder/Disturbance</li> <li>Erosion and Deposition</li> <li>Landslides, Mud/Debris Flows and Rock Falls</li> </ul>	Pandemic/Epidemic Hazardous Materials Release Active Shooter/Threat Explosive Attack/Bomb Threat Terrorist Attack		
	High	Wildlife-Vehicle Collisions	<ul> <li>Infrastructure Failure</li> <li>Power Failure</li> <li>Severe Wind</li> <li>Severe Winter Weather</li> <li>Thunderstorms and Lightning</li> <li>Hail</li> <li>Pest Infestation</li> <li>Extreme Temperature Heat/Cold</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Wildfire</li><li>Cyber Attack</li><li>Drought</li></ul>		

Matrix above shows the average risk of threats and hazards.

## FEMA's 32 Core Capabilities by Mission Area

The CEPA process assesses a county's ability to deliver FEMA's thirty-two core capabilities. Each of the capabilities falls within one or more of the five mission areas. The chart below illustrates the core capabilities in the mission area(s).


Prevention	Protection	Mitigation	Response	Recovery			
		Planning					
Public Information and Warning							
	Operational Coordination						
Intelligence and Information     Sharing		Community     Resilience     Infrastructure System		ems			
Interdiction and Disruption		<ul> <li>Long-term         Vulnerability         Reduction         Risk and         Disaster</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Critical         Transportation         Environmental         Response/Health     </li> </ul>	Economic     Recovery     Health and     Social			
Screening, Search, and Detection							
Forensics and Attribution	<ul> <li>Access         Control and         Identify         Verification</li> <li>Cybersecurity</li> <li>Physical         Protective         Measures</li> <li>Risk         Management         for Protection         Programs and         Activities</li> <li>Supply Chain         Integrity and         Security</li> </ul>	Resilience Assessment  Threats and Hazards Identification	<ul> <li>and Safety</li> <li>Fatality Management Services</li> <li>Fire Management and Suppression</li> <li>Logistics and Supply Chain Management</li> <li>Mass Care Services</li> <li>Mass Search and Rescue Operations</li> <li>On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement</li> <li>Operational Communications</li> <li>Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services</li> <li>Situational Assessment</li> </ul>	Services     Housing     Natural and     Cultural     Resources			

### What are the POETE Elements?

Each core capability assessment examines five elements: planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise (POETE). The elements are evaluated using a (1 to 5) scale: (1) represents a "very low" capability and (5) represents a "very high" capability. The overall capability assessment is the average of all five elements. Please refer to Annex D for more information of how capabilities and POETE are assessed.

Planning	Organization	<b>Equipment</b>	Training	Exercise
• Plans, policies, procedures, individual roles and responsibilities, mutual aid agreements, strategies, and involves collection and analysis of information.	• Individual teams, personnel, positions, an overall organizational structure, reporting chains, and leadership at each level.	• Equipment, supplies, and systems.	Content and methods of delivery.	• Exercises and actual incidents that provide an opportunity to demonstrate, evaluate, and improve the ability of core capabilities to perform assigned missions and tasks to established standards.

POETE elements work interdependently from one another. The chart below illustrates this through the Preparedness Cycle and shows the relationship between POETE elements capability improvement and preparedness.




"The Integrated Preparedness Cycle." Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Homeland-Security-Exercise-and-Evaluation-Program-Doctrine-2020-Revision-2-2-25

## Capability Key Findings

After reviewing the assessments for the 32 core capabilities and their POETE elements, the highest eight capabilities were assessed with "high" to "very high" capability illustrated by the top eight bars on the graph below. Six capabilities were assessed the lowest with "medium" capability illustrated by the bottom six bars on the graph below.


Most counties have similar trends, although the exact capability assessment marks may differ depending on the jurisdiction. For example, capabilities may vary drastically depending on the region, jurisdiction, and specific capability analyzed.



Please refer to the Annex A to view all thirty-two assessed core capabilities.

## Mission Area Core Capability Assessment

This report reviewed the thirty-two core capabilities in eight groupings of the five mission areas. The graph below shows the distribution of the assessment marks. The cross-cutting core capabilities are only considered in the cross-cutting category and are not included in the other categories.



The bottom horizontal line to the beginning of the box shows the first quartile (25%) of the data points. 50% of data points lie within the box. The top of the box to the top horizontal line shows 25% of the data point. The "x" in the box shows the average, the line within the box shows the median, and dots show outliers.

## Mission Area Core Capability Summary

The Cross-Cutting capabilities have the highest average, 3.67, and smallest data distribution. The average indicates jurisdictions have moderate to significant capability development. The small data distribution signifies counties have similar capability from one another. Capabilities were assessed high because they are exercised more frequently.

The Recovery Mission Area has the lowest capability average and one of the largest data distributions. The average capability of 2.57 indicates Economic Recovery, Health and Social Services, Housing, and Natural and Cultural Resources core capabilities were assessed at nearly half of desired end-states. A significant number of recovery capabilities are in the process of being established and developed.

"The CEPA data was utilized to show the benefit to upgrades of 95% of county network and security over the last two years, with an overall benefit of an enhanced cybersecurity posture." - Jerry Casebolt, OEM Logan County

Response and Recovery, Protection, and Prevention categories fall in the capability development stage. Additionally, Prevention and Protection, Response, and Mitigation category have significant capability progression, which is closer to the counties' self set capability targets.

The outliers show assessment marks outside of the distribution of other jurisdictions. This illustrates how capability varies depending on the location, resources, and desired capability determined by counties and municipalities.

The blue box list on the following pages show gaps and needs pertinent to the listed capability.

## **Cross-Cutting Core Capabilities**

The Cross-Cutting core capabilities were assessed the highest with moderate to significant capability development. Challenges across these capabilities included determining priorities, ensuring the priorities align with resources, and resource allocation. Opportunities to improve include the following validate roles and responsibilities, coordinate during incidents, partner collaboration, and enhance timely information sharing.

#### Public Information and Warning

- Many counties have at least two languages in their alert system, but may not know how many or what languages are required.
- Tourist and transient populations are difficult to communicate with for emergency notifications.

#### **Planning**

- Limited time to produce plans.
- Increase stakeholder participation, whole community inclusion, private sector, and agency awareness regarding functions, roles, and responsibilities.

#### Operational Coordination

- Review who is not receiving timely information.
- Coordinate with whole community partners in planning.
- Improve pre-coordination activities prior to and during events.




The graph to the left shows POETE averages for the core capability group. The blue and orange bars show Cycle 1a and 2a respectively. The green or red bar shows the difference between the two cycles. Graphs in this section follow this format.

## **Prevention Core Capability**

The Prevention Mission Area, with one capability in it, Forensics and Attribution, was assessed as having moderate development.

#### Forensics and Attribution

- Most counties do not have forensics laboratories.
- Sending out laboratory results can have long wait times and delayed responses.
- A lack of laboratory facilities and ability to conduct analysis in a timely manner may potentially impact court cases.
- A few counties would like to decrease their dependencies on mutual aid for this capability.



Most jurisdictions have MAAs in place for the Prevention capability, Forensics and Attribution, causing a high planning POETE element.

## **Protection Core Capabilities**

This mission area was assessed as moderate capability development and had no significant changes from the previous cycle.

#### Access Control and Identity Verification

- Identify critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) that require access identify verification.
- Improve employee termination processes.
- Identify additional funding sources to support technological improvements.

#### Cybersecurity

- Further understand vulnerabilities and threats.
- Develop cybersecurity plans with private sector partners.
- Exercise continuity plans for if information technology systems go down.
- Maintain updated equipment and staff training.

#### Physical Protective Measures


- Identify and prioritize CIKR that require physical protective measures.
- · Identify funding sources to support this capability.

#### Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities

- Develop protection activities.
- Increase understanding of countermeasures.
- Conduct risk assessments to improve investments.

## Supply Chain Integrity and Security

- Identify critical supply chain dependencies.
- Plan for critical resource levels.



## **Prevention and Protection Core Capabilities**

The Prevention and Protection capabilities are progressing moderately with no significant increases in POETE elements.

#### Intelligence and Information Sharing

- Refine platform sharing processes across jurisdictional boundaries.
- Train and utilize threat liaison officers (TLOs).


#### Interdiction and Disruption

- Opportunities to train in evidence handling procedures.
- Limited advanced training opportunities in some jurisdictions.

#### Screening, Search, and Detection

Modernization and new equipment specific training.

The planning element had significant capability in cycle 2a due to very strong capability to plan within the law enforcement centric capabilities, which make up the Prevention and Protection group.



## Mitigation Core Capabilities

The capabilities within this mission area are in the progression stage of development, although capability within this mission area varies vastly depending on the county.

#### Community Resilience

- Identify and develop community outreach programs to include education of potential hazards.
- Outreach to discuss tourism, insurance, education, and skill building.
- Increase collaborative planning.
- Insurance companies are pulling coverage in areas where there is a lack of fire abatement or inadequate fire district coverage, causing an inability to obtain coverage.

#### Long-term Vulnerability Reduction


- Build and sustain resilient systems.
- Incorporate mitigation measures in plans, building codes, and adopt vulnerability reduction standards in construction.

#### Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment

- Coordinate with whole communities and the private sector.
- Some counties would like to improve communication of threats and hazards to elected officials, community members, and responders to ensure they can make informed decisions.

#### Threats and Hazards Identification

• Grant funded and contracted out for development.



## **Response Core Capabilities**

The eleven core capabilities in the Response Mission Area are in moderate progression. Challenges across all eleven capabilities included limited personnel, continuous turnover, recruitment and retention of positions, and limited time to complete and update plans.

#### Logistics and Supply Chain Management


- Identify supply chain dependencies and alternate supply sources.
- Review distribution plans.
- Create volunteer management plans and donation management plans.
- · Warehouse and storage limitations.
- Accountability in the chain of custody process.

#### Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services

- Retain and recruit qualified staff.
- Limited capability to handle large, surge incidents.
- Increase behavioral health education and resources with responders and the community.

#### Situational Assessment

- Enhance information sharing from on scene to decision markers, including improving timely and accurate data.
- Interagency involvement in training and exercises.
- Some counties would like additional Incident Command structure training.



## Response Core Capabilities (Continued)

#### **Critical Transportation**

• Develop plans for debris management and evacuation.

#### Fire Management and Suppression

- Increase volunteer recruitment and retention.
- Limited volunteer availability to participate in training.
- Develop or maintain capital investment plans.

#### Environmental Response/Health and Safety

- Heavy reliance on MAAs to support hazardous materials incidents.
- Long response times.
- Some rural jurisdictions are looking to develop a higher capability in lieu of depending on mutual aid.

#### Fatality Management Services

- Increase stakeholder involvement in planning processes to include funeral homes, assisted living centers, and hospitals.
- Most partners do not have capacity for mass incidents.
- Counties' storage has relatively increased.



## Response Core Capabilities (Continued)

#### Mass Search and Rescue Operations

- Limited funding.
- Opportunities to train as volunteer units.
- Urban search and rescue training opportunities.
- Older volunteer demographic.
- Plan, train, and exercise with other agencies.

#### On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

- Limited staff to cover during training.
- Collaborative interagency training opportunities.
- Competitive salaries to increase retention for rural counties who lose qualified personnel to larger jurisdictions.

#### Operational Communications

- Dead zones that require additional towers, repeaters, equipment upgrades for current towers, and backup power solutions to towers.
- Radio programming needs.
- · Identify additional funding sources.

#### Mass Care Services

- Identify backup plans if mutual aid from the Red Cross is unavailable.
- Identify shelter locations, managers, and equipment.
- Review transportation and housing for a substantial number of large animals.

"The process made our stakeholder participation grow and increased community engagement. It created more collaboration in our Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) group." -Jennifer Kriegh, OEM Custer County

## **Recovery Core Capabilities**

The Recovery Mission Area capabilities were assessed low. Initial efforts are underway to develop these capabilities. There were decreases in the planning and organization POETE elements. Counties would like to further understand impacts the recovery capabilities have on their jurisdictions and identify ways to integrate the capabilities into planning processes. However, most jurisdictions identified limited time available to spend on the capabilities.

#### **Economic Recovery**

• Develop program, processes, and identify lead agencies responsible.

#### Health and Social Services


- Whole community inclusion into county plans.
- Identify solutions to address homelessness and migration in rural areas, as available resources become taxed when supporting large influxes of people.

#### Housing

- Limited affordable housing.
- Some counties do not have land capacity to support growth.
- Zoning challenges and a lack of regulation enforcement.

#### Natural and Cultural Resources

- Establish programs, response leads, identify natural and cultural sites.
- Restrictions in sharing protected information regarding natural and cultural resources and where they are located cause planning and recovering from a disaster.



## Response and Recovery Core Capability

The Response and Recovery Core Capability, Infrastructure Systems, was assessed as having moderate capability development. There was an increase in the planning element and a marginal decrease in the training element. Infrastructure is aging and needs to be updated; however, updating infrastructure is a long and expensive process.


#### Infrastructure Systems

- Lack of geographic information system (GIS) mapping, identification of CIKR, and prioritization of these resources.
- Increase private sector participation in planning processes.




"The audience, having been part of their own county CEPA evaluations, is already familiar with the concepts highlighted by the excerpts which gives us a head start in planning conversations. We use this opportunity to show the benefit of planning with peers and expanding their group of recovery planners."

-Kelly Strife, OEM Recovery



### **POETE Element Assessment**

This report identified trends and opportunities in each of the POETE elements. To do so, data analysis examined the average of each POETE element across all thirty-two core capabilities illustrated in the graph below.



The bottom horizontal line to the beginning of the box shows the first quartile (25%) of the data points. 50% of data points lie within the box. The top of the box to the top horizontal line shows 25% of data points. The "x" in the box is the average and the dots are the outliers.

## **POETE Summary Findings**

#### **Planning**

Constant evolving plans causes continuous need to train and exercise procedures, roles, and responsibilities.

- Highest average
  - Plans, policies, and procedures exist.
- Review existing plans, coordinate with other agencies, and update plans.

#### **Organization**

- Moderate progress towards developing this element.
  - Jurisdictions have approximately half of the necessary structure and staffing to support capabilities.
- Further understand agency roles and responsibilities.

#### **Equipment**

- Moderate progress towards developing this element. Most counties have at least half of the required equipment to support capabilities.
- · Challenges include:
  - Shortages of funding.
  - · High equipment maintenance costs.
  - Continuous equipment updates (e.g., modernization).
  - The need to develop capital investment plans to acquire new and additional equipment.

#### **Training**

Training has a large data distribution, indicating significant differences among jurisdictions in the element and/or among the thirty-two core capabilities.

- Around 40% of required training has been conducted.
- Challenges include:
  - Continuous need to train personnel (e.g., due to turnover).
  - Equipment updates and upgrades.
  - Limited flexibility to travel to attend or obtain training.
  - Cost to backfill or inability to backfill personnel while employees are training.
  - Limited course offerings in certain core capabilities.


#### Exercise

This element has the lowest assessment average and a large data distribution. There is a broad range of exercising capability dependent on the jurisdiction or core capability. Evolving plans, updates, new personnel, and new equipment all drive the need to exercise.


- Challenges include:
  - Developing, performing, and evaluating exercises.
  - Update plans, policies, and procedures from after action reports.
  - Improvement plans should reflect these findings.

## **POETE Element Gaps**

## <u>Planning</u>



The following plans require review, updates, or development: continuity, critical transportation such as debris management and evacuation, capital investment, distribution, volunteer management, donation management, fatality management, and critical resource levels.




The image above shows the three highest (i.e., left side) and three lowest (i.e., right side) assessed core capabilities in the planning area of the POETE framework.

The Threat and Hazard Identification capability planning element was assessed the highest based on counties' ability to use grant funds to contract Hazard Mitigation Plans development. The Housing capability planning element was assessed as low due to insufficient affordable housing, limited land area for development, and salaries to support local living costs. Planning in the Natural and Cultural Resources capability was low due to restricted information sharing for sites and locations, causing gaps in planning, preparedness, and operational activities.

## Organization

Heavy reliance on mutual aid may cause gaps in a counties' ability to identify agencies' roles and responsibilities. This is especially evident in the Environmental Response/Health and Safety capability.



The organization element in the Cybersecurity capability was assessed the highest, as agency leads and teams are well defined. Many counties identified their information technology (IT) departments as leads. Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services has strong organizational structures due to predefined positions, teams, and overall structure; personnel know who they report to and who is responsible for specific duties. The Natural and Cultural Resources organization element was assessed low due to a need to further understand the capability and identify responsible agencies.




"The CEPA data provided a wealth of insight for us, and helped to structure how we would reach out to each region. The CIAC Cyber Team used the CEPA data to reach out to our Regional Field Managers across the State to inquire about their areas of responsibility (AOR)/ cyber needs, based on the CEPA data for their AOR, and how the CIAC Cyber Team could be of assistance."

-Anthony Davis, CIAC

## **Equipment**

Capital Investment Plans must be developed and maintained to address equipment acquisition. The plans should account for long term expenditures, inflated costs, and prolonged manufacturing timelines.



The equipment element for the Public Information capability was assessed high, as most counties have alert systems and are in the process of enhancing them. The Logistics and Supply Chain Management equipment element was assessed low due to many counties needing to identify their supply chains and acquire the equipment to support them.



Natural and Cultural Resources

Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities


Logistics and Supply Chain Management



Public Information and Warning Fire Management and Suppression Mass Search and Rescue

## **Training**

The graphic below shows the most common gaps and opportunities in the Training POFTF element.



Natural and Cultural Resources, Economic Recovery, and Housing are the three lowest assessed capabilities. There is a need to better understand the associated roles and responsibilities to develop training. On-Scene Security and Protection is assessed high in the training element, as law enforcement has required training.



Fire Management and Suppression

On-Scene Security and Protection


Situational Assessment




Natural and Cultural Resources Economic Recovery Housing

#### **Exercise**

There is a constant need to evaluate plans, policies, and procedures. Exercises must keep up with personnel changes, new equipment, and evolving roles and responsibilities.




Community Resilience is one of the lowest assessed capabilities in the exercise element. There is a need to increase whole community inclusion in exercises. Increasing community members' participation in exercise deliveries would likely result in increased resilience. The Fire Management and Suppression exercise element was assessed the highest. This is due to a combination of exercise delivery and real world events that test plans and training.



### Capacity to Respond within Capabilities


CEPA assesses response capacity for fifteen capabilities. Counties review their ability to perform the capabilities without mutual aid. The graph below shows the average capability capacity assessed based on a twelve hour operational period. Please refer to Annex D for additional information on how response capacity is measured.



Environmental Response/Health and Safety has the lowest response capacity. Subsequently, many jurisdictions have MAAs to support related incidents. Some rural counties are looking to develop a higher capability in lieu of depending on mutual aid. Counties identified mutual aid reliance to support the Fatality Management capability, specifically for mass incident assistance. These two capabilities have an average of self maintaining for just over twenty-four hours. These capabilities will likely require the most assistance, mutual aid, or resources from the state.

### Capabilities Reliance on Grants

CEPA assesses each core capability's reliance on grant funding. Grant reliance is measured on a (1 to 5) scale: (1) indicates "no grant reliance" increasing to (4) "entirely grant reliant", and (5) an "unknown reliance". Please refer to Annex D for more information on the grant reliance assessment scale.




The graph above shows the top five grant reliant capabilities. If the funding went away for these capabilities, the ability to carry out their functions would most likely decrease significantly. Please refer to Annex C to see the to see the full capability grant reliance assessment.

"The insights gained have already proven essential, informing our community during the August LEPC meeting, guiding the revision of our Emergency Operations Plan, and sharpening our focus on areas needing improvement."




# Alignment with Integrated Preparedness Priorities

CEPA collects integrated preparedness data, which reveals county level preparedness priorities. This information can help to decide future priorities and provide insight to enhance a core capability. The data captures capabilities not prioritized and the absence of capabilities may reflect potential gaps and needs.



All five POETE elements were prioritized for the Cybersecurity, Public Information and Warning, and Operational Coordination capabilities. The following section shows capabilities identified as priorities in Integrated Preparedness Plans. These capabilities had positive increases in capability from Cycle 2a's previous CEPA report (i.e., 1a), illustrated on the following page.

### POETE Elements Identified in Integrated Preparedness Priorities



Pie Chart shows the percentage of POETE elements prioritized. Training was the most common POETE element prioritized across all thirty-two capabilities.

"The State Integrated Preparedness Section supports the Integrated Preparedness Process in part by utilizing the Colorado Emergency Preparedness Assessment (CEPA) to identify gaps, prioritize needs, and align resources for comprehensive emergency preparedness planning across the state regions."

-Greg Pettis, OEM Integrated Preparedness



### Capabilities Built and Lost

The table below identifies capability assessment average changes from Cycle 1 to Cycle 2, including changes in each POETE element. Please refer to Annex A to review the change in all thirty-two core capabilities.


Seven capabilities with the largest capability increase and three with the greatest loss are shown in the table. Most of the capabilities built were identified as priorities in preparedness planning. For example, Cybersecurity capability has increased and is a priority or focal point for most counties, as cyber threats are rapidly increasing globally. The three decreasing capabilities were not commonly identified as a priority in Integrated Preparedness Plans and were among the lowest assessed in overall capability.

				Change in POETE Assessme			ment	
Capability	POETE Average: Cycle 2	POETE Average: Cycle 1	Change	P	0	Eq	_	Ex
Threats and Hazard Identification	4.72	3.60	1.12 ▲	0.00	0.25	0.08	0.25	0.42
Interdiction and Disruption	3.63	2.75	0.88	0.33	0.00	0.33	0.08	0.08
Cybersecurity	3.72	2.98	0.73	0.83	0.58	0.42	0.42	0.25
Fire Management and Suppression	4.03	3.42	0.62 ▲	0.25	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.17
Intelligence and Information Sharing	3.73	3.13	0.60 ▲	0.17	0.08	0.50	0.67	0.58
Screening, Search, and Detection	3.25	2.67	0.58 ▲	0.42	0.50	0.50	0.33	0.42
Situational Assessment	3.85	3.35	0.50 ▲	0.42	0.17	0.08	0.08	0.00
Supply Chain Integrity and Security	2.88	2.90	0.02 ▼	0.17	0.08	0.08	0.17	0.33
Housing	2.13	2.27	0.13 ▼	1.17	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00
Economic Recovery	2.67	2.82	0.15 ▼	0.08	0.25	0.08	0.00	0.25



#### Assess and Functional Needs Assessment

CEPA includes an Access and Functional Needs (AFN) component. Counties review their programs holistically and assess each POETE element. The assessment reviews whether counties understand their demographics and have the critical life-saving resources their community may need to function during and after an emergency or disaster. These critical life-saving resources include communication, maintaining health/medical, independence, support services/safety, and transportation (CMIST) resources needed to function during an emergency.



Most counties are in the initiating phase. There is an overall understanding of access and functional needs, the CMIST resources, and frameworks are being implemented into planning and practice. Counties are currently working to:

Identify an agency, program lead, and partners

Identify required resources

Train first responders to recognize community members in need of resources


Promote whole community inclusion

Involve partners and stakeholders in planning processes

Assess the need for state support for capability development

Include all community languages in information sharing, systems, and websites

### Access and Functional Needs POETE Assessment



Pie chart shows the average POETE elements assessed for AFN. Please refer to Annex D for additional information on how AFN is assessed.

"Access and Functional Needs program found the CEPA data to be such a powerful planning tool that we utilize it to determine county-level Access and Functional Needs capabilities to understand the county's gaps and needs."

-Sadie Martinez, OEM Access and Functional Needs



### Conclusion

### **Summary**

Counties require additional support, personnel, equipment, and resources to meet their desired preparedness goals and measures. Jurisdictions are seeking opportunities to increase staffing, volunteer recruitment, and personal retention.

Counties are well developed in the cross-cutting capabilities. The Recovery Mission Area capabilities require further review and development, including:

- Housing
- Economic Recovery
- Natural and Cultural Resources
- Health and Social Services

Planning is the highest assessed POETE element. Most counties have plans, policies, and procedures supporting capabilities. To further develop this element, there is a need to update plans and review agreements (e.g., MOUs, MOAs). The training and exercise elements were the lowest assessed and require the most attention. There are continuous needs to train and exercise due to evolving plans, personnel turnover, and equipment upgrades and updates.

There are significant reliance's on mutual aid and regional collaboration to support partners. Counties anticipate needing mutual aid after twenty-four to forty-eight hours of the start of an incident for the following capabilities:

- Environmental Response/Health & Safety
- Fatality Management Services
- Mass Search and Rescue Operations
- · Logistics and Supply Chains.

The highest assessed threats and hazards include:


- Wildfire
   Thunderstorms and lightning
- Cyber attack Severe wind
- Drought
   Power failure

Jurisdictions require additional review of grant dependencies to better identify their impacts on capabilities. Most counties would like to research additional grant opportunities and identify alternate funding sources to support capabilities.


"CEPA shows us the needs of our stakeholders. We can plan, organize, exercise, train, and better equip our resources for the all-hazard bad day." - Mykel Kroll, OEM Fremont County

### **Next Steps for CEPA**

The graphic below shows upcoming goals and milestones for CEPA.



### Upcoming Schedule (2024-2025)



Schedule current at the time of publication.

### **Photo Rights**

The photographs used throughout this report are from the COEmergency Flickr account. The clip art used throughout this report are common domain and free stock photos from Pexels. The cover photo is not to be used without the permission from the owner.





Please scan the QR code above for additional information on CEPA or to contact the CEPA team with any questions.

### Annex A: Core Capabilities


### Capability Change from Cycle 1a to Cycle 2a

				Change in POETE Assessment				
Capability	POETE Average:		Change	Р	0	Eq	Т	Ex
Threats and Hazard Identification	Cycle 2 4.72	Cycle 1 3.60	1.12 🛕	0.00	0.25	0.08	0.25	0.42
Interdiction and Disruption	3.63	2.75	0.88	0.33	0.00	0.33	0.23	0.42
Cybersecurity	3.72	2.98	0.73	0.83	0.58	0.42	0.42	0.25
Fire Management and Suppression	4.03	3.42	0.62 ▲	0.25	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.17
Intelligence and Information Sharing	3.73	3.13	0.60 🛦	0.17	0.08	0.50	0.67	0.58
Screening, Search, and Detection	3.25	2.67	0.58 ▲	0.42	0.50	0.50	0.33	0.42
Situational Assessment	3.85	3.35	0.50 ▲	0.42	0.17	0.08	0.08	0.00
On-Scene Security & Protection	3.93	3.48	0.45 ▲	0.67	0.42	0.17	0.33	0.33
Risk Management for Protection Programs & Activiti	2.68	2.25	0.43 🛦	0.08	0.17	0.42	0.00	0.00
Planning	3.68	3.30	0.38	0.42	0.00	0.25	0.42	0.08
Risk-Disaster Resilience Assessment	3.18	2.80	0.38 🛦	0.42	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.17
Physical and Protective Measures	2.92	2.53	0.38	0.50	0.25	0.33	0.42	0.42
Operational Coordination	3.62	3.25	0.37 ▲	0.08	0.08	0.17	0.17	0.17
Mass Search and Rescue Operations	3.65	3.30	0.35 ▲	0.33	0.08	0.25	0.08	0.25
Access Control and Identity Verification	3.62	3.27	0.35 ▲	0.92	1.08	1.25	1.08	1.25
Mass Care Services	3.20	2.88	0.32 ▲	0.75	0.42	0.67	0.58	0.50
Forensics and Attribution	3.28	2.98	0.30 🛦	0.33	0.08	0.42	0.42	0.67
Community Resilience	2.90	2.67	0.23 ▲	0.50	0.25	0.58	0.92	0.83
Critical Transportation	3.20	3.00	0.20 🛦	0.67	0.33	0.42	0.58	0.25
Operational Communications	3.55	3.38	0.17 🛦	0.58	0.08	0.25	0.17	0.08
Infrastructure Systems	3.12	2.95	0.17 ▲	0.50	0.25	0.17	0.50	0.33
Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction	2.90	2.75	0.15 ▲	0.67	0.33	0.33	0.08	0.08
Public Health, Healthcare, Emergency Med Services	3.77	3.63	0.13 🛦	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.00	0.00
Natural and Cultural Resources	2.07	1.97	0.10 🛦	0.42	0.00	0.42	0.50	0.25
Public Information and Warning	3.70	3.62	0.08 🛦	0.08	0.08	0.17	0.08	0.00
Health and Social Services	3.42	3.35	0.07 ▲	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.08
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	2.78	2.73	0.05 🛦	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.08	0.08
Environmental Response/Health & Safety	2.83	2.80	0.03 🛦	0.92	0.33	0.67	0.42	0.67
Fatality Management Services	3.10	3.10	-	0.58	0.67	0.83	0.50	1.08
Supply Chain Integrity and Security	2.88	2.90	0.02 ▼	0.17	0.08	0.08	0.17	0.33
Housing	2.13	2.27	0.13 ▼	1.17	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00
Economic Recovery	2.67	2.82	0.15 ▼	0.08	0.25	0.08	0.00	0.25

### Annex B: Threats and Hazards

Natural	Human-Caused	Technological/Accidental		
Animal Disease	Active Shooter/Threat	Dam and Levee Failure		
Avalanche	Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Attack	Hazardous Materials Release		
Dense Fog	Civil Disorder/Disturbance	Infrastructure Failure		
Drought	Cyber Attack	Limited Ingress/Egress		
Dust Storm	Explosive Attack/Bomb Threat	Mass Transit Accident		
Earthquake	Terrorist Attack	Mass Transit/Casualty		
Erosion and Deposition	Subsidence and Abandoned Mine Lands	Mine Accidents		
Expansive Soils and Heaving Bed Rock		Power Failure		
Extreme Temperature Heat/Cold		Radiological Release		
Flood		Wildlife-Vehicle Collision		
Hail				
Landslides, Mud/Debris Flows, and Rock Falls				
Pandemic/Epidemic				
Pest Infestation	This classification of threats and hazards is what was most			
Post Wildfire Flooding				
Radon (Rn), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Methane (CH4) Seeps	commonly seen across counties; however, they can be classified differently			
Thunderstorms and Lightning	depending on the incident.			
Tornadoes				
Tumbleweeds				
Severe Wind				
Severe Winter Weather				
Water Contamination				
Wildfire				


#### Threats and Hazards Assessed to Include Additional Local Threats



<sup>\*</sup> Represents county added hazard. An \* followed by a number represents how many counties added the hazard.


### **Annex C: Additional Assessments**

#### **Grant Reliance**



Grant Reliance Scale		
5 Unknown		
4	Entirely	
3	Mostly >50%	
2	Somewhat <50%	
1	Not at all	

#### Capability Prioritization in Integrated Preparedness Plans



Twelve counties assessed five POETE elements for each capability. The bottom axis refers to the total number of POETE elements identified as a priority in each capability. If every county identified all five POETE elements for each core capability, the bar graph would indicate 60.

### Annex D: Definitions of Assessment Marks


Risk Assessment (Credible worst-case threat)			
	Likelihood		
Very Low (1)	This event is not expected to occur within this county.		
Low	There is the potential for this event to occur, but it is very unlikely in this county.		
Medium	This event could occur, but it generally does not happen with any regular frequency in this county (natural/accidental hazards) and current intelligence does not indicate that it is an imminent threat (for terrorism).		
High	It is likely that this event will occur in this county based on historical precedence (natural/accidental hazards) or current intelligence reporting (terrorism threats).		
Very High (5)	This event is expected to occur, without question, based on historical precedence in this county (natural/accidental hazards) or current intelligence reporting (terrorism threats).		
	Consequence		
Very Low (1)	This event would cause virtually no impact on the people, responders, property and economy in this county.		
Low	The impact of this event would be minimal on the people, responders, property, and economy in this county; response could generally be done without mutual aid.		
Medium	The impact of this event would be noticeable on the people, responders, property and economy in this county; mutual aid would likely be needed from other counties and/or the State.		
High	The impact of this event would be very significant on the people, responders, property and economy in this county; significant mutual aid resources would be called in from surrounding counties, the State, and the Federal government.		
Very High (5)	This event would have a devastating (or potentially catastrophic) impact on the people, responders, property and economy in this county; all mutual aid networks (local, State, and Federal) would be immediately utilized and government functions would severely or wholly be compromised.		

Response Capacity Scale			
Based on current capacity, a 12 hour operational period, and your experiences with previous disasters, how long can you deliver this capability without assistance from outside the county?			
Less than 24 hours	The county would need additional support or assistance from outside the county almost immediately.		
24 hours	The county would initially be able to deliver this capability for 24 hours or approximately two operational periods, but then would require support or assistance from outside the county.		
48 hours	The county would be able to deliver this capability for 48 hours or approximately four operational periods, but then would require support or assistance from outside the county.		
72 hours	The county would be able to deliver this capability for 72 hours, but then would require support or assistance from outside the county.		
More than 96 hours	The county would be able to deliver this capability for more than 96 hours without support or assistance from outside the county.		

	Capability Assessment Scale  POETE (Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, and Exercises)				
Score	Description	Scoring Metric			
1 Very Low Capability range: 0-20%	Recognition of the need but little or no effort or resources devoted to develop this element of the capability	<ul> <li>Planning: No relevant plans, policies/procedures exist</li> <li>Organization: 0-20% of the required organizational structure/staffing exists</li> <li>Equipment: 0-20% of the required equipment exists (to include facilities and materials)</li> <li>Training: 0-20% of the required training has been conducted</li> <li>Exercises: No exercises/real-world incidents have occurred in the past 5 years</li> </ul>			
2 Low Capability range: 21-40%	Initial efforts and resources underway to develop this element of the capability	<ul> <li>Planning: plans, policies/procedures exist</li> <li>Organization: 21-40% of the required organizational structure/staffing exists</li> <li>Equipment: 21-40% of the required equipment exists (to include facilities and materials)</li> <li>Training: 21-40% of the required training has been conducted</li> <li>Exercises: Exercises/real-world incidents have occurred; areas for improvement have been identified but not addressed</li> </ul>			
3 Medium Capability range: 41-60%	Moderate progress towards developing this element of the capability	<ul> <li>Planning: Plans, policies/procedures are complete, but require an update or need to be formalized</li> <li>Organization: 41-60% of the required organizational structure/staffing exists</li> <li>Equipment: 41-60% of the required equipment exists (to include facilities and materials)</li> <li>Training: 41-60% of the required training has been conducted</li> <li>Exercises: Exercises/real-word incidents have occurred; some identified areas for improvement addressed</li> </ul>			
4 High Capability range: 61-80%	Significant efforts underway and this element of the capability is nearly developed	Planning: Plans, policies/procedures are complete and have been updated within the past 5 years Organization: 61-80% of the required organizational structure/staffing exists Equipment: 61-80% of the required equipment exists (to include facilities and materials) Training: 61-80% of the required training has been conducted Exercises: Exercises/real-world incidents have occurred; most (more than 50%) identified areas for improvement have been addressed			
5 Very High Capability range: 81-100%	Element of the capability is fully developed and resources are devoted to sustain the effort	Planning: Plans, policies/procedures are complete/up-to-date & verified through exercises/real-world events Organization: 81-100% of the required organizational structure/staffing exists Equipment: 81-100% of the required equipment exists (to include facilities and materials) Training: 81-100% of the required training has been conducted Exercises: Exercises/real-world incidents have occurred; all (100%) identified areas for improvement have been addressed			

Access and Functional Needs Capacity Scale				
Based on current capacity and your experiences with previous disasters, to what level is access and functional needs incorporated and integrated within the county				
1 Unknown (0-20%)	The county is not aware of or has not implemented access and functional needs or the CMIST resource framework into planning and practice.			
2 Initiating Phase (21-40%)	Awareness: The county has an overall understanding of access and functional needs and the CMIST resource framework and has begun to implement these frameworks into planning and practice.			
3 Building Phase (41-60%)	Basic Understanding: The county understands and has identified their trust, economics, isolation (geographic, culturally, socially), capacity, housing, racism chronic influencers and how they impact access to CMIST resources during an emergency or disaster. The county has completed "how to" basic courses.			
4 Expanding Phase (61-80%)	Implementing: Access and functional needs advocates and whole communities are engaged and involved in the planning process. There are memorandums of understanding (MOU) and/or memorandums of agreement (MOA) in place with community partners. The county has CMIST Response Teams.			
5 Actualizing/ Improving Phase (81-100%)	Advanced: The county participates in resource sharing workshops. After action reviews, aimed to change behavior for continuous improvement, are applied and repeated.			

Reliance on Grant Funding			
	How reliant is the county on federal and/or state grant funds to support this capability?		
1 None at all	None. This capability is not supported by grant funds. We can deliver this capability without grant funds.		
2 Somewhat	Some (less than 50%) of this capability is or has been supported by grant funds. Without grant funds our ability to deliver this capability would be somewhat impacted.		
3 Mostly	Most (over 50%) of this capability is or has been supported by grant funds. Without grant funds our ability to deliver this capability would be significantly impacted.		
4 Entirely	All or nearly all. This capability is or has been supported by grant funds. Without grant funds we would not be able to deliver this capability.		
5 Unknown	Unknown. It is unknown whether grant funds support this capability. There is a need to determine this core capability's grant reliance.		





## COLORADO

Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Management

Department of Public Safety